A portrait of modern-day Turkey

EUGENE KAELLIS

In biblical times, the people who lived in what is now Turkey (for the most part, Anatolia) were almost certainly identified as the Hittites. Their relationship with Israel varied. It may be recalled that Bathsheba, who caught David’s concupiscent eye, was married to Uriah, a Hittite, who was conveniently sent into battle by David and consequently disposed of.

Modern Turkey derives from the centre of the Ottoman Caliphate Empire that, at its greatest extent, stretched through the Middle East, including Palestine, across North Africa at one end and into the Balkans, Moldavia and the Crimea on the other. During the 19th century, the independence of Greece, long under Ottoman rule, became a cause célèbre for British romantics; Byron, for example, who went there to fight, ended up instead dying of a fever at Missolonghi. In its final days, the Ottoman Empire was often referred to as “the sick man of Europe” because of its weak, inefficient, corrupt and often brutal rule from Istanbul (formerly Constantinople). The Balkans still redound to the religious-cultural relics of Ottoman hegemony, as witnessed in the bloody Bosnian (largely Muslim) versus Serb (largely Orthodox Christian) conflict following the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

In the First World War, the empire fought on the side of the Central Powers, largely because of its close economic ties with Wilhelmine Germany and the realization that there was a growing Middle East rivalry with Britain and France. It quite successfully repulsed a British-led Australian-New Zealand invasion at Gallipoli, but when the Central Powers lost the war, the Ottomans were stripped of their vast colonies and transformed themselves into a modern, officially secular, Turkish republic.

Ottoman history thus placed a persistent gulf between Turkey and its former Arab colonies, which included Palestine, and other of the Middle East’s now independent Arabic principalities. Partly as a consequence, for much of the existence of Israel, Islamic but non-Arabic Turkey has had cordial relations with the Jewish state, including significant trade and an exchange of high-level government visits. At one time, Turkey even suggested a plan to ship water to supply Israel’s growing needs. In the severe earthquake of 1999, Israel sent considerable aid and personnel to the Turks. Nonetheless, Turkish mass media now often depict Israelis as villains. Turkish TV, rarely sensationalist, has even described Mossad operatives as baby-snatchers.

With the growth of militant Islamism and especially since the interception by the Israelis of a Turkish-registered “relief” (provocation) vessel, with an on-board majority of Turks, headed for Gaza in 2011, relations have cooled considerably. Israeli civilian flights can now enter Turkish airspace only after receiving advance permission, a marked contrast with Turkey’s previous policy.

Prominent Turkish politicians, conveniently overlooking the evident hostile intentions of Iran, with which Turkey has a border, have recently also criticized the United States for devoting so much attention to Iran’s nuclear program, while ignoring Israel’s nuclear capabilities. Israel and Turkey now have a billion-and-a-half (in U.S. dollars) annual, almost balanced, trade, which is increasing.

Cynical though an approach based primarily on perceived economic interests may be, it is nevertheless a useful consideration and, frequently, especially in international affairs, provides an explanation for what might otherwise be seen as irrational behavior. I refer to the “Las Vegas-style” approach of uncovering the underlying motivation of many, perhaps most, conflicts, viz., “Follow the money.” Applied to international affairs, perhaps more elegantly stated, the British approach, “Nations do not have friends, they have interests.”

With no petroleum resources of its own, Turkey’s dependency on Arab or Iranian oil has influenced its international political stance. However, the recent discovery of Leviathan, a substantial hydrocarbon field under the eastern Mediterranean, between Cyprus on the west and Israel and Lebanon on the east, may eventually ease that dependence. Right now though, Leviathan is stimulating a competition among Israel, Turkey, Lebanon and Cyprus to exploit the resource, in ways that have yet to be resolved multilaterally.

While Turkey and Israel do not share a border, unlike other Middle Eastern countries, Turkey can present a formidable challenge in the unlikely event that it becomes openly hostile to Israel. With a population of about 75 million and a million-strong, well-equipped military, Turkey is far more capable militarily than Israel’s Arabic enemies. In the days of the USSR, sharing a border with then-Soviet Georgia and a then-communist satellite Bulgaria, Turkey eagerly joined NATO and received considerable military aid from the United States. These factors are important deterrents to any hostility Turkey may want to express against Israel.

Even before the USSR, Turkey had been threatened by the Russians, who felt blocked in by Turkish control of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, effectively threatening to limit Russian Black Sea access to the Mediterranean and beyond. Note, for example, the Crimean War of 1854-6 that involved Britain and France and even Sardinia, fighting (somewhat) successfully alongside Turkey against the czar’s armies and ending in a rather inconclusive settlement. Non-Soviet Russia has geopolitical designs similar to those of communist Russia.

Turkey is home to a few minority populations. Many of its small Jewish population are descendants of refugees of the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions in the final years of the 15th century. But the minority of greatest historical importance is that of the (Christian) Armenians, against whom there were significant pogroms, which culminated in a major genocide in 1915, something the Turks still obstinately deny, claiming that the Armenians were fomenting revolution and had to be suppressed – although the mass and indiscriminate killing of Armenian women and children is undeniable. The “success” of that genocide inspired Hitler, by his own admission, to propose the Final solution. As we approach the centennial of the Armenian massacre, this wound on Turkey’s pride will, of course, be re-opened and one can expect more denials. Another significant Turkish minority, the Kurds, still sustains a separatist movement, which sometimes clashes with the Turkish military.

Not Arabic, Turkey does not have the most benign attitude toward Arabs, who, before the First World War, bitterly resented Ottoman hegemony. After the war, Turkey, shorn of its dominion over Arabs, became a secular republic, permitting women and cultural-religious minorities equal rights, at least in theory. Oddly enough, it is the Turkish army that sometimes plays a significant role in sustaining state secularism.

Today, as one of the world’s largest Islamic nations, Turkey is now increasingly affected by militant Islamism, which has significantly impacted its relations with Israel. It is not only the government that reacts, in their apparent dissatisfaction with a secular regime in the midst of the resurgence of Muslim fundamentalism, some female Turkish university students, contrary to prevailing custom, have voluntarily started wearing head coverings and traditional clothing. Evidently, there is, among some Turks, an association of the West with materialism and degeneracy and an accompanying ennui for something more substantial, which some believe is to be found in a resurgent Islam.

For a long time, relations, including trade, between Turkey and Israel were excellent. From Israel’s perspective, the recent decline in friendly relations can, in part, be blamed on Turkey permitting a vessel under its registry to violate Israeli territorial waters in an apparent deliberate and violent provocation and then complaining about the predictable (some say, restrained) Israeli reaction, which resulted in several deaths.

Turkey does, however, continue to maintain close ties to the West. Meanwhile, perhaps the discovery of Leviathan, reportedly “one of the world’s largest gas finds of the past decade,” can provide a huge benefit to Turkey, Israel and Cyprus, from energy and economic standpoints. However, as previously stated, it remains to be seen how the claims will be settled – hopefully without the intervention of the United Nations and without increasing the tension of an already fraught relationship.

Eugene Kaellis has written Making Jews, on the theme of the current basic problem of Diaspora Jewry, which is available from lulu.com.

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