Your illusion of choice

MARTIN SHERMAN JERUSALEM POST

The image of a new false prophet is rising above the wreckage of shattered hopes and abandoned dreams that litter the desolate political landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This latest illusion comes in the shape of Abu Mazen.
For the fanatical adherents of peace (or rather, of withdrawal), the newly elected Palestinian Prime Minister is the last gleam of hope for resuscitating the embers of their Oslowian vision (or rather, fantasy).

However, the chances of this seductive apparition providing the yearned-for tranquillity are slim. For there are only two alternatives regarding the nature of any prospective solution of the violent conflict between Israel and the Palestinians: Either (a) the solution is person-specific, with its success depending on the character of the incumbent Palestinian leader; or (b) it is not person-specific, with it success depending on more profound processes in Palestinian society, its nature and its structure.

Now, if on the one hand, the latter version is correct, the replacement of the current leader with another will have little effect. For the radical elements, such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, who enjoy wide public support, will be most unlikely to defer to the will of the new leadership. In fact, this is precisely the claim that Arafat's apologists raise in his defence, namely that he is unable to rein in the extremists, even though he would like to do so.

Moreover, apart from stiff opposition from hardened rivals, any alternative leader will have to contend with the ingrained hatred that years of incitement by the Palestinian media have bred, creating enmity towards Israel in the hearts of many.

Consequently, in order to restrain the various elements determined to attack Israel and Israelis, any prospective Palestinian leader would have to undertake measures so wide- ranging and so severe that they would virtually constitute a civil war. Indeed, although it seems highly plausible that blows inflicted on the extremist factions should strengthen the moderates and their leaders, the targeted killing earlier this month of Said Arabid a senior Hamas member in Gaza was condemned as measure that weakened Abu Mazen.

This raises a troubling question: Given that moral suasion is unlikely to work as an instrument of restraint, just how is any Palestinian leader supposed to wage an effective campaign against the extremist elements?

If on the other hand, the first version is correct, and any solution of the conflict is dependent on the personality of the Palestinian leader, the implications for Israel are even more serious.

For if far-reaching Israeli concessions are made on the basis of the traits of a given Palestinian leader such as Abu Mazen, what will be the fate of the agreement if the tenure of that leader is terminated, whether as a result of illness, assassination or rebellion?

Indeed, Israel has had bitter experience involving the instalment of favorably disposed Arab leaders, as exemplified by the 1982 assassination of Bashir Jemayel in Lebanon.

Of course one might protest that this is the nature of international agreements and that if concern about the character of future regimes is reason enough to prevent reaching agreement, no agreements would ever be concluded. However, in the case of an Israeli-Palestinian accord, any conceivable agreement will differ greatly in terms of its significance for Israel from a routine treaty made in the usual conduct of international affairs.

For Israel, the concessions called for in order to conclude an agreement with the Palestinians, have crucial, long-term ramifications that impinge on its very strategic ability to survive. These include the loss of control of vital hydro-strategic resources; the creation of a long and tortuous frontier, on the very fringes of major population centres along the seaboard metropolis; total topographic inferiority for a coastal plain, barely 20 kilometres wide and 100 kilometres long, in which 80 per cent of the country's population and 80 per cent of its economic activity are located, and which will be left completely exposed and vulnerable.

Accordingly, the nature of the future regime likely to succeed that of Abu Mazen is of vital significance for Israel. After all, agreements can be signed in an instant, but the concessions made in them along with the vulnerability that they create will continue.

It would be most prudent, therefore, to refrain from any false hope that the deceptive illusion a new Abu Mazen regime may instil in the Israeli public.

The disappointment and despair that it is likely to leave in its wake will be even more acute than those of today.

Martin Sherman lectures in political science at Tel-Aviv University.

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