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June 15, 2007

Civil war in territories

Editorial

When Hamas joined the Palestinian government in a coalition with Fatah, some in the world community warned of the danger in allowing an armed militia to enter the chambers of, ahem, a democracy.

Political violence and democracy are antithetical. Parliamentary democracy depends on elected officials talking out their conflicts, no matter how long it takes – and it can take a while. In Canada, for instance, we have been dealing with the role of Quebec for decades and, since 1981, attempting to address the fact that the province is not a signatory to this country's constitution.

By permitting armed factions to participate in the democratic process (or, in the case of the Palestinian territories, the pale reflection of a democratic process) we invite the inevitable sooner or later. As we see now, when armed factions do not like the slow and compromising course of democracy, old habits emerge. The violence between Hamas and Fatah is the direct result of the world community's refusal to demand that Hamas lay down its arms or engage in the political process.

Israeli history is often cited as a template for or, more accurately, a justification for various Palestinian acts. Pre-state Israel was riven with internal and external conflicts. Both the Irgun and the Haganah were involved with activities that could reasonably be termed terrorism or, as it is sometimes called, "national liberation." The two groups would fight among themselves at the very moment of the birth of the state of Israel – but the victory of the Haganah, which would form the basis for the Israel Defence Forces, was a necessary precursor to the evolution of a democratic state. The Altalina affair, which was the climactic incident in the rivalry between the two forces, was a fratricidal tragedy. But it was the last intra-Jewish military incident. It was also a lesson from Israeli history that the Palestinians might have learned from, but have not.

By attempting to cut corners and skip the vital step of disarming all but the government's forces, the Palestinians were destined to face the brutality we see this week. An additional factor is the simple equation that a society saturated in violence will eventually find that violence turning inward.

Ehud Barak, the once and perhaps future prime minister of Israel, learned one of the hardest lessons of Israel's life when the negotiated agreements he made with the Palestinians came to nought. The hope that the Palestinian leaders, whose political modus operandi is terror, had seen the light of civilization and were committed to peaceful resolution, proved to be folly. Barak, should he find himself leading the country again, will almost certainly operate on different assumptions about the reliability of Palestinian promises.

The grotesque conflict that has erupted into what must now be reasonably called civil war in the Palestinian territories is symptomatic of a cancer that has been fully evident for at least seven years. As we said in this space just last week, there should have been worldwide revulsion on Sept. 28, 2000, when the Palestinians traded the negotiating table for guns. There was not. There was no reward for peace, no punishment for violence.

Of course, the dichotomy of "moderate" Fatah and "terrorist" Hamas is a false one. It was Fatah – led by Yasser Arafat and his successors – whose choice on Sept. 28, 2000, was to opt for violence, rather than negotiation. This fighting, therefore, is not an example of a legitimate government versus an insurgency. It is not even, as it is portrayed in the media, a battle between two wings of a legitimate government. It is a battle between two warlord-led factions for whom the security and progress of the Palestinian people is insignificant.

If Hamas wins, we will see an Iranian- or Syrian-style Islamist theocracy in the territories. If Fatah wins, well, the fate of the Palestinian people will be marginally better. But until both sides commit to democracy and peaceful negotiated resolution to political differences, there will be no peace.

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